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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the recently decided Oil Platforms case
announced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It remarks
on the internal inconsistencies and problems associated with the
Court's holding. The ICJ's holding inconsistently applies the
traditional "use of force" doctrine as applied in other cases decided
by the Court, thereby providing evidence of other factors at work
in the Court's decision. Indeed, an analysis of the holding, along
with an examination of the several separate opinions, exhibits the
ICJ's desire to reprimand the United States for its current actions
in Iraq and its fundamental misunderstanding of the "proper" use
of force. This Article also contributes to the scholarship on the
developing role of the ICJ and provides commentary on
international tribunals playing a quasi-political role in
international affairs.
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I. Introduction
2In the fall of 2003, the ICJ 1 decided the Oil Platforms case, a
highly contentious, eleven year-old case relating to the use of
force, self-defense, and the permissibility of retaliation measures.
In this case, the Court examined the legality of both the military
actions taken by the government of Iran and the American military
responses to those actions. The gravamen of Iran's complaint to
the ICJ was that U.S. forces shelled two off-shore Iranian oil
platforms, destroying them both on October 19, 1987,4 and then
attacked an additional offshore oil complex on April 18, 1988.'
The United States countered that Iran had been using the oil
platforms as a base from which to launch missiles against
American vessels legitimately sailing in international waters.6 The
Iranian complaint, filed on November 2, 1992, four years after the
attacks, claimed a dispute "arising out of attack [on] and
destruction of three offshore oil production complexes, owned and
operated for commercial purposes by the National Iranian Oil
Company... on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988,
respectively."7 The United States responded and, from 1992 to
I The International Court of Justice will be referred to as "the Court" or "the ICJ"
throughout this paper.
2 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S)., (Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106.PDF
(last visited Oct. 27, 2004). The ICJ had already made a determination on its jurisdiction
to hear the case, which is often referred to as one of the other "decisions" of the ICJ in
the Oil Platforms case. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S)., 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Nov. 12)
(Preliminary Objection Judgment), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/
iop/iop-isummaries/iopisummary_19961212.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004)
[hereinafter Preliminary Objection Judgment].
3 Oil Platforms, supra note 2.
4 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2597 (1987); see also Patrick D. Robbins, The War
Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 141, 168-69
(1988) (discussing some of the events setting the destruction of the oil platforms into
motion).
5 Press Release 2003/38, I.C.J., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S)., Decision of the Court
(Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/
ipresscom2003-38_op-20031106.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
6 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (Preliminary Objections of the United States, Annex
I), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/ioppleadings/iop-ipleadings-l9931216
_preobj.us_05.pdf (Dec. 12, 1993).
7 Preliminary Objection Judgment, supra note 2, at 804. Most of the litigation by
the Iranian government was driven by the National Iranian Oil Company, which had a
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2003, the parties filed numerous motions and pleadings before the
Court. The case was finally argued in February 2003 and decided
in October 2003.8
The Court's ultimate decision is highly important not only for
the apparent limits it places on the doctrine of self-defense, the use
of force, and the role of treaties in defusing military relations
between countries, but, perhaps, even more important for the
significant procedural advances the Court made in this decision.
For the first time in the Court's history, the ICJ entertained the use
of counterclaims by both parties in the pleadings, leading other
countries, such as Yugoslavia, to file their own counterclaims in
their respective unrelated ICJ litigation.9 Now, the Court has
issued "orders... on the standards by which counterclaims could
proceed before the [International] Court,"1° a development that
will undoubtedly change the structure and nature of litigation
before the ICJ in virtually every case to come before it in the
future.
Part II of this Article discusses the recent international legal
scholarship regarding the U.S. invasion in Iraq, its legitimacy
under international law, and how that invasion may have shaped
the Court's decision. Part III discusses the events that led up to
the litigation before the International Court of Justice. Part IV
examines the Court's decision, including the arguments advanced
by the parties and the Court's responses to those arguments.11
Finally, Part V of this Article will argue that the ICJ's decision in
Oil Platforms was an attempt by the Court to comment on the U.S.
invasion in Iraq and, without the U.S. invasion, it is likely that the
Court's holding would have been more favorable to the United
stake in the case because it wanted compensation for the damage to its oil platforms.
Interview with Allen S. Weiner, Professor, Stanford Law School (previously Legal
Counselor, U.S. Embassy, The Hague), in Palo Alto, Cal. (Jan. 21, 2004).
8 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (Summary of the Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iop-isummaries/iop-isummary_20031106.
htm [hereinafter Summary of the Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003].
9 Sean Murphy, Amplifying the World Court's Jurisdiction Through Counter-
Claims and Third-Party Intervention, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 5, 10 (2000).
10 Id.
I I At the time this work was written, there were no articles or notes explaining the
Oil Platforms decision. Therefore, this work will describe the decision in detail as part
of the commentary on the case.
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States. This Article argues that the ICJ is inevitably and
inescapably a politically aware institution within the international
community, one that is still searching for its proper role and
identity within the world community, and one that necessarily
takes into account the current circumstances and recent actions of
the international community when making its decisions. In the
Conclusion, this Article argues that even if the Court does not
make its decisions based exclusively on the historically accepted
four sources of international law, 2 the existence of a Court as a
semi-political actor that reacts to the actions of states on the world
stage is still of considerable benefit to the international
community.
II. Commentaries on the "Use of Force" and the Oil Platforms
Case
Over the past century, international law regarding the use of
force by states has developed significantly, with perhaps the most
radical transformation engendered by the United Nations
Charter. 3 As early as 1837, the United States engaged in dialogue
with other nations on the proper use of force and legal self-
defensive measures under international law. 4 These dialogues
12 Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice Statute states the "most
authoritative sources of international law" used by the I.C.J. when deciding cases:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (1945), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited
Oct. 20, 2004), reprinted in THOMAs BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 19-20 (2002) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
13 LoRi F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 920 (4th
ed. 2001).
14 The Caroline incident is one of the earliest examples of two states trying to
negotiate the minefield that is "self-defense" under the use of force doctrine in
international law. See CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 239 (1945) (describing the Caroline
incident, in which Canadian subjects attacked a ship that Great Britain claimed was
2004]
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played a role in articulating the requirements of "necessity" and
"proportionality,"''  now well established as two bedrock
principles in determining the proper use of force by one state
against another.16 The 1945 United Nations Charter also explicitly
recognized the right of self-defense,17 but did not add much clarity
or specification to the two aforementioned key principles, leaving,
as one noted international law scholar remarked, "[a] degree of
uncertainty or indeterminacy that inheres in the proclaimed legal
limits" for self-defense. 8  Therefore, the challenge for
international legal scholars, governments, and especially the ICJ,
is to interpret the evidence and incidents leading to a country's use
of force in a manner that reduces to the greatest extent possible
this uncertainty and indeterminacy.
This challenge becomes more acute and pressing as modern
methods of attacking a country beget modem methods of
responding to such attacks. 9 With the advent of easier weapon
helping an insurgent movement in Canada); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, On the
Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 214-20 (2003) (describing the
Caroline incident in detail and making a case for the preemptive strike on Iraq under the
auspices of the Caroline incident).
15 HYDE, supra note 14, at 239. "[E]xceptions growing out of the great law on self-
defense do exist, [but] those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the
'necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation."' Id. (quoting Daniel Webster's letter to Lord
Ashburton on Aug. 6, 1842). Webster also included a proportionality requirement in a
previous letter during the Caroline incident: "[i]t will be for [the British government] to
show, also, that the local authorities of Canada... did nothing unreasonable or
excessive .. " DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 13, at 923 (quoting Daniel Webster's
letter to Lord Fox on Apr. 24, 1841).
16 See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The
Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 540-43 (1999); W. Michael
Reismann, The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on Its Lawfulness and Implications,
5 EuR. J. INT'L L. 120, 125 (1994).
17 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (stating "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations...").
18 OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 (1991).
Schachter states, "[s]ome indeterminacy results from the key standards of necessity and
proportionality, concepts that leave ample room for diverse opinions in particular cases.
Other sources of uncertainty can be traced to differing interpretations of the events that
would permit forcible defensive action." Id.
19 See Karen DeYoung & Cohm Lynch, Bush Abandons Bid to Win U.N. Backing
for War, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at A16 (examining President Bush's attempt at
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delivery systems and the development of such programs as theater
missile defense, the question of how to defend one's country has
become paramount in recent years. In this regard, scholars
particularly debate the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq
under international law.2 ° Moreover, the diversity of opinion
among scholars regarding the U.S. invasion of Iraq exhibits the
extraordinary difficulty of coming to a clear consensus on the use
of force under international law.2' Indeed, in the words of one
scholar, "these controversial issues indicate that the rules of self-
defense fall far short of a code of conduct that would provide
precise 'hard law' for many cases likely to arise. 22
Despite this lack of a code of conduct, however, a majority of
scholars have concluded that the unilateral action by the United
States in Iraq, without formal authorization from the United
Nations Security Council, violated customary international law
and the use of force doctrine.23  Among the most serious
obtaining U.N. backing for an invasion of Iraq); Peter Slevin, Legality of War is a Matter
of Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at A16 (discussing many scholars' take on
whether U.S. actions in invading Iraq are legal).
20 See, e.g., Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the
Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Accused
of Irrelevance and Deeply Divided Over Iraq, the United Nations Has Never Mattered
More, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2003, at B 1; Symposium, 'A War against Terrorism ': What
Role for International Law? U.S. and European Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209
(2003); Ruth Wedgewood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and
Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576 (2003); John Yoo, International Law
and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003); see also Erik J. Woodhouse, Two
Paths Diverging: The Use of Force in International Law After Iraq 12 (Jan. 23, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Stanford Journal of International Law)
(commenting on the divergent opinions regarding the legal use of force in Iraq and
arguing that the U.N. needs to clarify the precedent set by the U.S. invasion).
21 See supra note 20 and the sources cited therein.
22 SCHACHTER, supra note 18, at 141.
23 Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 227, 240 (2003) ("[R]ecourse to a Security Council mandate is the only
acceptable solution, both as a matter of law and policy..."); Tom J. Farer, The Prospect
for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 628 (2003)
("In terms of the global.., interest, there was a case for regime change in Iraq.. . [b]ut
outside the framework of the United Nations, the change could not be accomplished in a
way that would be widely perceived as legitimate."); Thomas M. Franck, What Happens
Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 616 (2003) ("[T]he invasion
of Iraq is more accurately seen as a repudiation of the central decision-making premise
of the [U.N.] Charter system...").
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arguments lodged against this U.S. action is that "the United States
government has articulated a doctrine of pre-emption whose
parameters are uncertain and that is potentially very broad in
scope. 24
It is against this backdrop of both the U.S. invasion of Iraq and
the emerging scholarly attacks on that invasion that the ICJ
decided the Oil Platforms case. While the Court did not explicitly
reference the invasion or expressly base its decision on the
scholarly commentary criticizing the invasion, one cannot help but
conclude that these developments underlined the decision.
This Article argues that in the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ
recognized that the U.S. invasion of Iraq, if it were to be
considered a legitimate example of general practice accepted by
law, would significantly expand the notion of the appropriate use
of force under international law, especially as a matter of
preemptory self-defense. To combat this expansion, the Court
decided the Oil Platforms case in a manner designed to curtail this
possible expansion of the use of force doctrine and to prevent
other nations from taking any legal comfort in the actions of the
United States.25  Many commentators and scholars have
commented on the actions of the United States in Iraq.26 The Oil
Platforms case became a tool for the ICJ to comment on the
appropriate use of force doctrine in international law, to discipline
the United States for its actions, and to establish with more
certainty its own role in defining international law, even in relation
to notions of self-defense. In the final analysis, whatever the
precise doctrinal legacy of this decision, this judicial reprimand of
U.S. actions in Iraq establishes the Court's institutional importance
and legacy.
24 Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 628, 635 (2003) (footnote omitted).
25 It is understood that the Court, much like a government entity, is not monolithic
and is made up of a number of actors with a number of views. The Court did not act in
complete unison when it made its decision (see infra Part V for a parsing of the different
statements by the ICJ justices in the decision), and, therefore, the decision likely captures
the views of several members of the Court, but not all. The views of the majority,
however, are important in terms of analyzing how the ICJ deemed the U.S. actions
inappropriate within the use of force context, while the separate opinions issued by
several justices along with the judgment are important in explaining the thoughts and
concerns of certain justices on the Court.
26 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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Of course, the Oil Platforms holding does not elucidate all
aspects of the doctrine of self-defense that could profitably be
developed as a matter of international law. But the Court has
addressed other parts of this issue in years past, and these cases
will continue to play an important role in determining the legality
of certain activities. Of primary importance among these cases is
the ICJ's 1986 holding in the Military and Paramilitary Activities
case.27 By citing the Military and Paramilitary Activities case in
its Oil Platforms decision, the Court apparently considered the
depth of the discussion in that case to be useful and relevant,
because its discussion of the precise contours of self-defense in the
Oil Platforms case is far less detailed and comprehensive than its
discussion in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case.28 But
interestingly, the analysis in the Oil Platforms case extensively
addresses the merits of certain claims and defenses, without
actually deciding those claims, before holding that neither party's
claims were valid under the Treaty of Amity of 1956.29 Indeed,
this anomaly is recognized by members of the Court.3 ° Since
ruling on defenses asserted by the United States was unnecessary
in light of the Court's initial decision regarding Iran's claim, the
27 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S)., 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus-ijudgment/inus-ijudgment
-19860627.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); see also Richard Falk, Appraisals of the
ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 106, 106 (1987)
(stating "[this decision is a] fascinating attempt through judicial inquiry to assess
convincingly the relevance of law to an ongoing armed conflict.., it leads the Court to
pronounce specifically upon the core issue of when force can permissibly be used in
international relations, as well as the contours of a claimed right of collective self-
defense in the setting of interventions and civil strife").
28 One can note the differences in the opinions (both dealing with complex issues)
of the Oil Platforms case and the Military and Paramilitary Activities case by the
differing length of the opinions. Oil Platforms is a 55 page decision. Oil Platforms,
supra note 2. Military and Paramilitary Activities is a 137 page opinion. Military and
Paramilitary Activities, supra note 27.
29 See Oil Platforms, supra note 2, at paras. 31-64.
30 See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (separate opinion of Judge Owada), paras.
29-40 (stating that once the Court came to the conclusion that the Iranian claims against
the United States were not justified, the Court should not have gone into the defensive
arguments offered by the United States), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106_owada.PDF (Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter
Separate Opinion by Judge Owada]. In the interest of disclosure, Judge Owada was my
professor and an advisor, teaching international law during the my M.A. program at
Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan from 2000-2001.
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determination to do so exhibits the Court's passion to rebuke the
United States. The Court's discussion, which can charitably be
described only as dicta (and less charitably as detour and frolic), is
best understood as an attempt to narrow the use of force doctrine
in international law, thereby impeding other countries from
entertaining thoughts similar to those of the United States.
III. Events Leading Up to the Conflict in the ICJ
A. General Iranian-U.S. Relations
Since the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the seizure of the
U.S. Embassy and the hundreds of personnel within it, Iranian-
U.S. relations have unquestionably been strained.31 Subsequent
disputes between the United States and Iran, including U.S.
support for Iraq's hostilities against Iran32 and the U.S. Navy's
destruction of an Iranian Air Airbus 300 passenger plane, killing
its passengers and crew,33 obviously did not improve relations.
Interestingly, however, neither country has renounced the Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Treaty of
Amity)34 which continued in force without any interruption
between the two countries, and which figured prominently in
Iran's subsequent claim against the United States.35 Somewhat
31 Michael Koehler, Two Nations, A Treaty, and the World Court: An Analysis of
United States-Iranian Relations Under the Treaty of Amity Before the International
Court of Justice, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 287, 287 (2000); see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BACKGROUND NOTE: IRAN (discussing the serious relations issues between the United
States and Iran), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm#relations (last modified
Aug. 2004).
32 See Michael Dobbs, U.S. Had Key Role in Buildup of Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2002, at Al (discussing the links between the Reagan administration in the buildup
of Iraqi arms during the Iran-Iraq war).
33 See Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S)., 1996 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 22).
Although the pleadings were entered with the ICJ, this case was eventually settled. U.S.
and Iran Settle Financial Claims, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1996, at A23.
34 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955,
U.S.-Iran, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, available at http://www.irvl.net/iran-treaty.htm [hereinafter
Treaty of Amity].
35 The Treaty of Amity is part of a series of treaties "generically referred to as
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties negotiated between the United States
and other sovereign nations." Koehler, supra note 31, at 288. Neither party expressed
an intention to terminate the Treaty of Amity prior to the time that the Oil Platforms case
was brought to the ICJ, although the United States did announce its intention to sever
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surprisingly, the United States and Iran interacted peacefully
through the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal,36 which was established
after the Islamic revolution and the resolution of the hostage
crisis37 and was designed to satisfy the claims each country and
their nationals had against the other.38 Thus, up until the point that
the United States attacked Iranian oil platforms in the Persian
Gulf, the two countries encountered each other on a myriad of
fronts, some amicable, but more often antagonistic.
B. Events Leading to the Destruction of the Oil Platforms
The United States alleged in its pleadings that Iraqi
provocations initially led to its decision to destroy three Iranian oil
platforms in the Persian Gulf.39 According to the United States,
this provocation had its origins in the eight year Iraq-Iran war.4"
As that conflict progressed, Iranian forces began to threaten not
only American interests in the Gulf, but also the oil operations of
states not involved in the conflict.4 In the face of persistent
Iranian threats and attacks, the Reagan administration agreed in
March of 1986 to re-register a certain number of Kuwaiti oil
tankers under the U.S. flag and to provide a U.S. Navy escort in
subsequent commercial relations with Iran in 1987. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, 55 Fed.
Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 30, 1987) (declaring an embargo on most Iranian-produced goods),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/legal/eo/12613.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004).
36 For a general discussion of the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, see Schandor S.
Badaruddin, Choice of Law Decisions in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 4 EMORY INT'L
L. REv. 157, 157-84 (1990).
37 IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, BACKGROUND INFORMATION: IRAN-
UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, at http://www.iusct.org/background-english.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
38 See IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, LIST OF AWARDS AND DECISIONS
(showing numerous awards beginning in 1982 and continuing through 2001), at
http://www.iusct.org/lists-eng.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
39 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 24.
40 Id.
41 These threats to nations not involved in the conflict were evidenced by the
Kuwaiti request for relief from both the American and Soviet governments. See H.R.
REP. No. 100-106, at 1-3 (1987) (discussing the background of the Kuwaiti reflagging
operation and stating that, prior to the reflagging, Kuwaiti ships came under constant fire
of Iranian missiles once shipping came under attack by both sides in 1984).
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the Persian Gulf.42 As U.S. naval vessels patrolled the Gulf to
ensure the safety of oil tankers and other commercial vessels, five
specific events occurred that led to the U.S. attack on Iranian oil
platforms. First, on May 17, 1987, an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter
plane attacked the U.S.S. Stark in an alleged accident and killed
thirty-seven sailors with the firing of two Exocet missiles.43
Second, on July 24, 1987, the U.S.S. Bridgeton, a reflagged
Kuwaiti tanker, struck a mine in the Persian Gulf while being
escorted by the U.S. Navy." Third, on September 21, 1987, U.S.
gunships spotted an Iranian naval vessel laying mines in the Gulf
and engaged the ship in a fire fight.45 Fourth, on October 8, 1987,
U.S. helicopters, on patrol in the Gulf, engaged four Iranian patrol
boats, resulting in the sinking of one of those boats.46 Finally, on
October 16, 1987, an allegedly Iranian-based silkworm missile hit
one of the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers.47
On April 11, 1988, in an effort to retaliate and prevent further
attacks from being launched from other oil platforms, the U.S.
Navy attacked two oil platforms in the Reshadat complex.48 Three
days later, another U.S. warship struck a mine in international
waters. 49  Thereafter, on April 18, 1988, combined U.S. naval
forces attacked and destroyed additional Iranian offshore oil
complexes.5" Four years after these events, and after failed
diplomatic negotiations, Iran filed an application to initiate
42 See 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2597 (1987) (discussing the safety of Kuwaiti oil
tankers and calling for providing protection to those tankers); see also S. REP. No. 100-
102, at 2-3 (1987) (discussing the plan of a U.S. Navy escort for the reflagged Kuwaiti
oil tankers).
43 See 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2597 (1987) (reporting the Stark incident and
stating that this incident caused Congressional members to conclude that there was a
significant risk of armed conflict that merited consultations between the President and
Congress under the War Powers Act).
44 Robbins, supra note 4, at 168.
45 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2597 (1987). This fire fight resulted in the deaths of
three Iranian soldiers and wounded twenty-six others who were aboard the Iran Ayr. Id.
46 Id.; see Robbins, supra note 4, at 168.
47 Robbins, supra note 4, at 168-69; see Summary of the Judgment of November 6,
2003, supra note 8, at para. 25.
48 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 25.
49 Id. para. 26. The warship hit by the mine was the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts. Id.
50 Id.
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proceedings within the ICJ on November 2, 1992."'
IV. The ICJ Procedure and Holding in the Oil Platforms Case
A. The Initial Filing and Jurisdictional Concerns
In its pleadings before the ICJ, Iran contended that the acts
undertaken by the United States in April of 1988 constituted a
"fundamental breach of the various provisions" of the Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (Treaty of
Amity), which, it claimed, had determined the bilateral
relationship between Iran and the United States since its signing in
1955.52 The application invoked the Court's jurisdiction under
Article XXI, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity.53 Upon
notification to the United States of the application entered in the
ICJ, the Court invited both parties to file a Memorial and Counter-
Memorial to the application within the time limits for filing.54
The United States initially objected to the jurisdiction of the
Court on the grounds that the case did not involve a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty of
Amity.55 After conducting hearings on the U.S. objection, the ICJ
confirmed its jurisdiction and rejected the preliminary objection.56
Upon receiving notice of denial of the preliminary objection, the
United States filed a Counter-Memorial, which included a
51 See Oil Platforms (U.S. v. Iran) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (describing
procedures which the Iranian government attempted to negotiate the dispute and seek
compensation between July and August of 1992), at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopframe.htm (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Application
Instituting Proceedings].
52 Id. § 1.
53 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 1.
54 Id. paras. 2-5. Iran requested an extension of time limits for its Memorial until
June 8, 1993, and the United States also received an extension for the filing of the
Counter-Memorial until Dec. 16, 1993. Id. para 4. The ICJ Statute detailed the
procedures the Court would follow in allowing extensions, the filing of memorials and
counter-memorials, as well as the procedures for allowing parties to raise preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court during the proceeding. See ICJ Statute, supra
note 12, arts. 40(2), 79(1).
55 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (Preliminary Objection Submitted by the United
States), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/ioppleadings/iop-ipleadings_199
31216_preobj-us_02.pdf (Dec. 16, 1993).
56 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 7-8.
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counterclaim against the government of Iran.57 Iran, in turn,
vehemently opposed the admissibility of the counterclaim filed by
the United States, arguing that such claims were not permitted
under the rules of the Court.58 The ICJ, for the first time in its
history, held that a counterclaim would be admissible within the
proceedings and, accordingly, allowed the government of Iran to
reply to the U.S. counterclaim and the United States to, in turn,
submit a rejoinder.59 After various extensions, both countries filed
their respective orders, and the ICJ scheduled oral arguments on
the merits to begin on February 17, 2003.60 Subsequently, the ICJ
heard oral arguments from the governments of Iran and the United
States in February and March of 2003.61 Eight months later, the
Court presented its findings as the Judgment of November 6,
2003.62
B. The Judgment of November 6, 2003
In the final analysis, the Court managed to deny the claims of
both nations and enter a judgment that seemed to allow both
parties to claim victory to some degree. First, the Court held that
the actions of the United States against Iranian oil installations
could not be justified under Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty of
Amity.63 At the same time, it also held that the U.S. attacks did
57 Id. paras. 9-10. The counterclaim alleged that Iran's actions in the Gulf during
1987-88 precipitated the retaliations by the United States and that "Iran's actions...
involved mining and other attacks on U.S.-flag or U.S.-owned vessels." Id.
58 Id. paras. 10-11. Iran argued that under Art. 80 of the ICJ Statute, the
counterclaim articulated by the United States did not meet the formal requirements and
should not be considered by the Court. Id. The Court allowed written submissions from
both parties on the admissibility of the U.S. counterclaim, allowing both sides to detail
their written observations on their respective positions. Id.
59 Id. paras. 11-12; see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9-10 (stating that
"counterclaims were not major components of the cases before the P.C.I.J. [Permanent
Court of International Justice] and I.C.J. up until 1997").
60 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 13-14.
61 Id. para. 17.
62 Summary of the Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003, supra note 8.
63 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 78. Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty of Amity
reads: "The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures ... (d)
necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential
security interests." Treaty of Amity, supra note 34, art. XX(l)(d).
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not constitute a violation of obligations to Iran under Article X(1)
of the Treaty of Amity.64 Commentators, and specifically the
Legal Advisor for the U.S. Department of State, stated that the
decision of the ICJ was consistent with U.S. arguments regarding
the level of fault of the United States.65 Iran was less pleased with
the decision, as Iranian officials alleged the ICJ ruling was
politically motivated and full of contradictions.66 Indeed, Iran
went so far as to deem the ruling "unjustifiable," asserting that the
Court ignored the egregious actions of the United States due to
political reasons. 67  Despite these comments, the Iranians
welcomed the dismissal of the U.S. counterclaims.68
1. The Initial Look at the Counterclaims
In its decision, the Court took the claims in reverse order,
dealing first with the counterclaims of the United States against
Iran.69 There was some logic to this order, as the United States
implored "the Court [to] dismiss Iran's claim and refuse it the
relief it seeks because of Iran's allegedly unlawful conduct."7
The United States based its argument on three related principles,
all variations of the "clean hands" doctrine.7 First, it argued that
because Iran committed illegal armed attacks on U.S.-flagged
shipping and other neutral shipping in the Gulf, Iran had acted
"improperly with respect to the subject-matter of a dispute" and
could not receive the relief that it sought.72 Second, the United
64 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 99. Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity reads:
"Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of
commerce and navigation." Treaty of Amity, supra note 34, art. X(1).
65 See World Court: U.S. Wrong to Hit Platforms, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Nov. 7,
2003 (quoting U.S. Dept. of State Legal Advisor William H. Taft who said that "[w]e
didn't bring the case, Iran brought the case, and the court sent them home empty-
handed").
66 See Iranian Spokesman Says ICJ Ruling on US Attacks "Political," BBC
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Nov. 8, 2003.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 30.
70 Id. para. 27.
71 See id. para. 28.
72 Id. para. 27. Generally this is known as the "unclean hands" defense. See id.
para. 28. The allegation was essentially that Iran had misrepresented the facts of the case
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States contended that Iran itself violated obligations that were
identical to Iran's application to the Court against the United
States and, therefore, the application was not entitled to relief.73
Finally, the United States asserted that Iran's complaints were the
result of its own wrongful conduct and should be rejected because
a petitioner could not receive relief when the "actions it complains
of were the result of its own wrongful conduct.,74 In sum, the
United States asked the Court to "make a finding that the United
States measures against the platforms were the consequence of
Iran's own unlawful uses of force."75 The ICJ concluded that in
order to make this finding it would have to investigate Iranian and
U.S. actions during the period in question to rule on both the U.S.
counterclaim and the Iranian claim.76 The Court next turned to
examine the jurisdictional issues present in the case between Iran
and the United States.
2. Investigating the Jurisdictional Issues
The Court next examined the jurisdictional issues raised by
both the United States and Iran, specifically whether the ICJ
possessed the relevant jurisdiction to adjudicate on the
interpretation or application of the Treaty.77 The United States
contended that although Article XXI(2) of the Treaty gave the ICJ
jurisdiction for disputes between Iran and the United States under
the Treaty,78 U.S. actions against Iran were consistent with the
wording of Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty and, therefore, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.79 The United States
when presenting them to the Court. See id.
73 See id. para. 27.
74 Id.
75 Id. para. 29.
76 See id.
77 Id. para. 31.
78 Treaty of Amity, supra note 34, art. XXI(2). Article XX(1)(d) reads as follows:
"The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures... (d) necessary to
fulfill the obligations of the High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests."
Id.
79 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 31-32; see also Treaty of Amity, supra note
34, art. XX(1)(d) (stating "[t]he present Treaty shall not preclude the application of
measures ... (d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the
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contended that even if its actions were a breach of Article X(1) of
the Treaty,8 ° those actions were necessary to protect its essential
security interest as defined under Article XX(1)(d) and, thus, did
not constitute a breach of the Treaty.8' In looking at security
interest claims by the United States, the Court first examined the
precise breaches of the Treaty alleged by both Iran and the United
States to determine whether those breaches would be excused as
exceptions under Article XXI of the Treaty.82
3. The Underlying Self-Defense Argument
The United States based much of its argument on the general
doctrine of self-defense under international law,83 arguing that its
"actions were not wrongful since they were necessary and
appropriate actions in self-defense."84  The United States also
highlighted that the ICJ's reaction to its defense in the proceedings
was extremely important to the world community, since the
Court's ruling would have serious implications for the future
development of the doctrine of use of force in international law.85
The United States and Iran differed in their interpretations of
the doctrine of self-defense and the exception for essential security
under Article XX(l)(d) of the Treaty.86 In deciding this issue, the
Court relied heavily on its previous ruling in Military and
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its
essential security interests").
80 Treaty of Amity, supra note 34, art. X(1) (stating "[b]etween the territories of the
two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation").
81 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 32.
82 See id. para. 35.
83 See generally DAMROSCI-I ET AL., supra note 13, at 955-73 (focusing the
discussion on such topics as anticipatory self-defense, armed attacks, customary
international law, necessity, nuclear weapons, proportionality, protection of nationals,
terrorism, traditional law, and the U.N. Charter).
84 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 37.
85 Id. (stating "[t]he self-defense issues presented in this case raise matters of the
highest importance to all members of the international community ... and both Parties
are agreed as to the importance of the implications of the case in the field of the use of
force... ").
86 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (Reply and Defense to Counter-Claim Submitted
by the Republic of Iran), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/ioppleadings/
iop-ipleadings_19990310_replyir_03.pdf (Mar. 10, 1999).
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Paramilitary Activities. In that case, the government of
Nicaragua brought a claim against the United States for covert
military operations in and around Nicaragua, claiming that the
United States was unlawfully carrying out military operations
against its government.88 The United States countered that it was
engaged in collective self-defense, and was, therefore, within its
defensive rights to engage in activities to protect itself and other
nations. 89 The Court rejected the U.S. claim of collective self-
defense and held that the United States had acted "in breach of its
obligation under customary international law not to use force
against another State. 9 °  In the Military and Paramilitary
Activities case, the Court emphasized limits on the acceptable
parameters of self-defense under international law, stating that an
attack is deemed lawful only when in "observance of the criteria
of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in
self-defence."91  The Court stated that it would apply the same
requirements of necessity and proportionality that were used in the
Military and Paramilitary Activities case in its decision in the Oil
Platforms case. 9'
4. Reevaluating Jurisdiction Under the Self-Defense
Claim
The Court in Oil Platforms considered its jurisdiction under
Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of Amity to decide whatever question
might arise in the application or interpretation of the U.S. defense
claim utilizing its own interpretation of Article XX(1)(d). 93 The
Court questioned whether a party would be justified in taking
measures it considered necessary for protecting its essential
87 See, e.g., Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 51, 60.
88 Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 27, paras. 20-23. Nicaragua
claimed that the United States acted in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United
Nations Charter and of the customary international law obligation to refrain from the
threat or use of force, that its actions amounted to intervention in the internal affairs of
Nicaragua,... and that it violated the sovereignty of Nicaragua. Id. para. 23.
89 Id. para. 24.
90 Id. para. 292.
91 Id. para. 194.
92 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 39.
93 Id. paras. 21-26.
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security interests, especially questioning whether such 'necessary'
measures related to the validity of those measures as acts of self-
defense.94 In order to decide this question, the ICJ invoked
language from the Military and Paramilitary Activities case,
stating that "the interpretation and application of [Article
XX(1)(d)] will necessarily entail an assessment of the conditions
of legitimate self-defence under international law."95 The Court
then proceeded to examine the conditions stated by both the
United States and Iran in determining whether the "essential
security interest" exception of the Treaty of Amity applied to the
U.S. defense in Oil Platforms.96 It stated that it would examine the
claim by the United States within its understanding of the
"principle of the prohibition in international law of the use of
force, and the qualification to it constituted by the right of self-
defence."97
C. Looking at Specifics in the Self-Defense Exception
The Court first examined the October 19, 1987 U.S. attack on
the Reshadat oil complex. 98 At the time of the attack, the Reshadat
complex linked twenty-seven oil wells through three drilling and
production platforms, but was not producing oil due to a previous
attack by the Iraqi government. 99 On October 19, 1987, four U.S.
Navy destroyers approached the Reshadat complex and, after
warning Iranian personnel to leave the area, shelled one of the
platforms.'0 ° These destroyers then began an unplanned attacked
on another platform that was deemed a "target of opportunity" by
the U.S. Navy.'O°  Immediately thereafter, the United States
94 Id. paras. 31-78.
95 Id. para. 40.
96 See id. paras. 46-72 (examining the attacks on the Reshadat platform, and the
Nasr and Salman platforms).
97 Id. para. 43. Additionally, the United States did not deny that its actions against
the Iranian oil platforms constituted the use of armed force. See id. para. 45.
98 Id. para. 46.
99 Id.
100 Id. para. 47.
10l Id. The original plan called for attacking the R-7 Reshadat oil platform (there
were three in the area, identified as R-3, R-4, and R-7). Id. The R-4 platform was that
"target of opportunity" and was "severely damaged," while the R-7 platform was
"almost completely destroyed." Id. Because of these attacks, Iran claimed that oil
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delivered a letter to the Security Council of the United Nations
pursuant to U.N. Charter Article 51,102 stating that the United
States had taken measures to exercise its inherent right of self-
defense under international law.
113
In the Oil Platforms case, the United States argued that it had
an inherent right of self-defense due to Iranian attacks on
commercial shipping channels.1 °4 In response, the Court stated
that the United States must show:
that attacks had been made upon [the United States] for which
Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a
nature as to be qualified as 'armed attacks' within the meaning
of that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
and as understood in customary law on the use of force.10 5
In addition, the Court demanded that the United States show
"that its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed
attack made on it, and that the platforms were a legitimate military
target open to attack in the exercise of self-defence."'0 6 In sum,
the ICJ required the United States to shoulder the burden of
proving that an armed attack took place, that Iran was responsible,
and that the steps the United States took in response were
necessary and proportional to the provocation and taken upon
legitimate military targets.
1. Evidence Surrounding the October 19, 1987 Attack
The Court ultimately held that the United States had not met
production from these platforms could not be re-started for several years. Id.
102 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council ....").
103 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 48; see also Letter from U.S. Permanent
Representative of Oct. 19, 1987, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19219 (stating
"[iun accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations... United States
forces have exercised the inherent right of self-defense under international law by taking
defencive action in response to attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United
States vessels in the Persian Gulf").
104 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 48.
105 Id. para. 51. The Court relied on the Military and Paramilitary Activities case as
stating the necessity of an "armed attack" on the party claiming self-defense and the
importance of proof of the origin of the attack. Id.
106 Id.
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its burden of proof.1 °7 The United States offered various types of
proof to attribute the October 16, 1987 attack on the U.S.-flagged
Sea Isle City to Iranian forces, but to no avail.0 8 The United
States offered satellite or aerial reconnaissance images showing
alleged missile sites under Iranian control, expert analysis of the
missile fragments, and testimony on the type of missile that hit the
U.S.-flagged oil tanker.0 9 The United States also offered the
testimony of two Kuwaiti security officers stationed near the
launching site who claimed that they witnessed the launching of
missiles from an Iranian-controlled area."' ° One officer also
claimed to have personally observed the path of the missile that hit
the Sea Isle City."'
In response, Iran challenged the validity and reliability of the
U.S. evidence.11 Concerning the U.S. claims about Iranian
missiles, Iran argued that there were no operational missile sites
located in the area where the missile launch supposedly
occurred" 3 and that Iraq may have launched the missile in order to
internationalize the conflict. 14 Iran responded to the testimony of
the Kuwaiti security offers by pointing out that their testimony
was over ten years old and that, in any event, it contained
discrepancies between the English and Arabic texts of the
statements provided to the ICJ. "5
Based on the evidence presented by the United States and Iran,
the Court determined that "a conflict of evidence" existed" 6 and,
107 Id. para. 61 (stating "[i]n short, the Court has examined with great care the
evidence and arguments presented on each side, and finds that the evidence indicative of
Iranian responsibility for the attack... is not sufficient to support the contentions of the
United States").
108 Id. paras. 53, 61.
109 Id. para. 53.
110 Id.
''' Id.
112 See id.
113 Id. para. 54. Additionally, Iran argued that the satellite images of the Iranian-
controlled area were not clear and that the sites in the pictures did not resemble a normal
missile launching site. Id.
1t4 Id. para. 55.
115 Id. para. 58.
116 Id. para. 59. The Court remarked on the overwhelming evidence but stated that
"[t]here is, however, no direct evidence at all of the type of missile that struck the Sea
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in light of this "serious deficiency in the evidence," it could not
find evidence "sufficient to support the contentions of the United
States" regarding the October 19, 1987 incident." 7 Thus, the
Court rejected the U.S. claim that the incidents leading up to the
October 19, 1987 attacks constituted an armed attack of the "most
grave form of the use of force," and, therefore, under the reasoning
of the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, the United States
stepped outside the bounds of self-defense under international
law."18
2. Evidence Surrounding the April 18, 1988 Attack
The Court then analyzed the April 18, 1988 attacks by the
United States on two oil platforms," 9 noting the existence of
linkages between certain actions by Iran and the United States'
right to exercise self-defense. °  With respect to the Iranian
Salman complex, two U.S. destroyers and a supply ship first
warned Iranian personnel and then called in an attack from
numerous ships, warplanes and helicopters.12 Shortly thereafter,
three warships and several helicopters destroyed the Nasr
complex. 22 That same day, the U.N. Security Council received a
letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to
the U.N. stating again, in a virtually identical recitation to its
previous missive, that the United States was exercising its inherent
right of self-defense "by taking defensive actions in response to an
attack" by Iran. 123 This letter described how a mine had struck the
Isle City; the evidence as to the nature of other missiles fired at Kuwaiti territory at this
period is suggestive, but no more." Id.
117 Id. paras. 61, 64. The Court did note, however, that the attack on the Sea Isle
City was not the only incident relied upon by the United States as a response to an
"armed attack" and discussed numerous incidents alleged by the United States. Id. paras.
62-63.
118 Id. para. 64.
119 Id. para. 65.
120 Id. paras. 67-68.
121 Id. paras. 65-66.
122 Id. para. 66.
123 Id. para. 67; see also Letter from U.S. Permanent Representative of Apr. 18,
1988, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19791.
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations... United
States forces have exercised their inherent right of self-defence under
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U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts in international waters four days earlier
and that the United States had conclusive evidence that this mine
was manufactured in Iran. 24 In addition to the destruction of the
platforms, however, this time the United States also attacked
Iranian ships in an operation called "Operation Praying Mantis."'
' 25
The United States asserted these ships were also legitimate
military targets. 121
Again, the ICJ examined the proof offered by the United States
against Iran for the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts attack.127  Iran
claimed that it laid mines purely for defensive purposes, away
from main shipping lanes, and that the mine in question may have
been laid by Iraq. 2  The United States claimed that Iranian mine
laying activities were much more extensive than those suggested
by Iran's pleadings. 129  In addition, the United States offered
evidence that moored mines found in the same area as the attack
on the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts bore serial numbers matching
other Iranian mines.
30
The Court found this evidence to be "highly suggestive, but
not conclusive,"' 31 and noted that there were no additional
justifications cited for the April 18th attack. 13 2 Because the lone
mine was the only incident claimed as justification for the
destruction of the Nasr and Salman platforms, the Court first
examined whether such an incident could suffice to justify an
international law by taking defensive action in response to an attack by the
Islamic Republic of Iran against a United States naval vessel in international
waters of the Persian Gulf. Id.
124 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 67.
125 Id. para. 68.
126 Id. Damage done to the military targets included destruction of two Iranian
frigates and other naval vessels and aircraft of Iranian registry. Id.; see also David F.
Winkler, Operation Praying Mantis Blows a Hole in Iranian Navy, NAVY LEAGUE OF
THE U.S. (Sept. 2003) (describing Operation Praying Mantis), at
http://www.navyleague.org/sea-power/sep-03_45.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
127 Summary of the Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003, supra note 8.
128 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 70-71.
129 Id.
130 Id. para. 71. These other Iranian mines were found by the United States when it
boarded the mine laying vessel Iran Ajr in a previous incident. Id. paras. 63, 71.
131 Id. para. 71
132 Id. para. 72.
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action for self-defense. 133  It then concluded, again, that the
evidence against Iran was inconclusive and it was, therefore,
unable to deem this action a justifiable response by the United
States. 134
3. Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defense
The ICJ then dealt with the criteria of necessity and
proportionality as elements in international law relating to self-
defense. 35  The United States claimed that "[a] measure of
discretion should be afforded to a party's good faith application of
measures to protect its essential security interests" in determining
whether an armed response in self-defense is in fact
"necessary."' 136 The Court noted that Iran conceded certain U.S.
security interests were reasonable, such as ensuring the safety of
U.S. vessels and crew and ensuring the unimpeded flow of
commercial shipping in the Gulf, but that Iran's concessions did
not extend to the destruction of the oil platforms. 137 The ICJ also
noted that the "necessity" requirement under international law was
"strict and objective," excluding any room for discretion or a good
faith defense by a party.'38
The ICJ's holding in the Military and Paramilitary Activities
case deeply informed the Court's analysis of the necessity and
proportional criteria.'39 A central component of these criteria is
"the nature of the target of the force used avowedly in self-
133 Id.
134 Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned:
The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military
vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the 'inherent right of self-
defence' ... the Court is unable to hold that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr
platforms have been shown to have been justifiably made in response to an
,armed attack' on the United States by Iran .... Id.
135 Summary of the Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003, supra note 8.
136 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 73.
137 Id.
138 Id. "The Court does not however have to decide whether the United States
interpretation... is correct, since the requirement of international law that measures
taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and
objective, leaving no room for any 'measure of discretion."' Id.
139 Id. para. 74.
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defence," 141 which, in this case, consisted of the destruction of the
Reshadat, Nasr, and Salman oil platforms, several Iranian frigates,
and other Iranian vessels and aircraft. 141 Citing both Military and
Paramilitary Activities and Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons,142 the Court stated that the necessary and
proportional prongs for the self-defense exception to the use of
force were "rule[s] well established in customary international
law."' 43 Because the Court was not satisfied that the attacks on the
platforms were necessary to respond to the incidents claimed by
the United States, it felt that the U.S. claim of using self-defense
actions in response to an Iranian armed attack was difficult to
maintain. 144 The United States argued that the Iranian platforms
constituted legitimate targets for military action and that Iran used
the platforms as a military communications link and a staging area
for attacks on neutral shipping.'45 The United States attempted to
show the military nature of the oil platform targets by producing
expert analysis of the circumstances surrounding the attacks,
documents found on the Reshadat complex and aboard the Iran
Ajr vessel, and testimony by members of the international
community allegedly aware of the oil platform's military use.146
The Court conceded that the United States offered considerable
evidence for the military nature of the Reshadat platform, but it
questioned the adequacy of proof regarding the Nasr and Salman
platforms.'47
Iran, on the other hand, claimed that the military personnel and
equipment on the platforms were merely defensive and necessary
to repel possible future Iraqi attacks. 148 Additionally, Iran argued
that the documents produced by the United States were
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996-1 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July
8) (Advisory Opinion).
143 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para 76.
144 Id.
145 Id. para. 74.
146 Id. paras. 63, 74.
147 Id. paras. 66, 74. These complexes were not boarded due to the unsafe
conditions and secondary explosions caused by the initial U.S. attacks. Id. para. 66.
148 See id. para. 75.
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mistranslated and read out of their proper context and that
testimony by the United States was speculative and vague as to the
platforms' use.'49 The ICJ concluded the evidence produced by
the United States was not sufficient to establish a military purpose
for or presence on the Reshadat platform. 5 ' The finding that the
United States did not first complain to Iran about the military
activities of the platforms was an additional factor in determining
that the targeting of the platforms was not a necessary act of self-
defense.' 5' Hence, the Court was unable to hold "that the attacks
made on the platforms could have been justified as acts of self-
defence."' 52  Thus, the Court concluded that U.S. reprisals
following the alleged Iranian attacks on the Sea Isle City and the
mining of the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts were not a "necessary"
response by the United States. 153
Turning to the proportionality requirement, the Court held that
the retaliation for the attack on the Sea Isle City was proportionate,
but, since the attack was not "necessary," it was not a legal
exercise of force. 54  The Court paused longer on the
proportionality of the April 1988 attacks. It first examined
whether destroying an oil platform was a proportionate response to
mining a naval vessel. 55 Although not completely ruling out the
possibility in future cases, the Court concluded that the U.S.
bombing campaign in response to the mining of a single U.S.
warship was a disproportionate use of self-defensive force under
customary international law. 156
149 See id.
150 See id. para. 76.
151 See id.
152 Id. para. 76. The Court ignored the U.S. claims regarding the Salman and Nasr
platforms because the United States did not offer any evidence comparable to the
evidence offered on the Reshadat oil platform's military nature. Id. para. 76.
153 Id.
154 Id. para. 77.
155 Id.
156 See id. The Court stated:
[T]he Court cannot assess in isolation the proportionality of that action to the
attack to which it was said to be a response; ... the whole operation, which
involved, inter alia, the destruction of two Iranian frigates and a number of
other naval vessels and aircraft ... [can not] be regarded, in the circumstances
of this case, as a proportionate use of force in self-defense.
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Without conclusively determining what factors might create
necessity and proportionality, the Court held that the United States
did not act in accordance with its right to self-defense. 57
Therefore, the Court concluded that the attacks on the Iranian oil
platforms in October 1987 and April 1988 were not justified under
Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty of Amity as "measures necessary to
protect the essential security interests of the United States." '
Because the U.S. reprisals did not qualify as acts of self-defense
under international law, the ICJ held that these actions did "not fall
within the category of measures contemplated, upon its correct
interpretation, by [Article XX(1)(d)] of the Treaty [of Amity]." 159
D. Judgment on Iran 's Claims
Following the conclusion that the United States could not rely
on Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty of Amity as a defense against
the Iranian claims, the Court then examined Iran's claim against
the United States under Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity. 160
Iran contended that the U.S. attacks on the Reshadat, Nasr, and
Salman oil platforms constituted a breach of U.S. treaty
obligations.161 Iran claimed that since the U.S. attacks focused on
commercial oil-producing facilities that would subsequently
export oil to the United States, the attacks prevented the freedom
of commerce between the two nations, in violation of the Treaty of
Amity. 162  To evaluate Iran's claims, the Court first examined
whether commerce did in fact exist between the two nations in
relation to the particular oil platforms and then examined whether
the U.S. attacks impeded that commerce.1 63
Id.
157 See id. para. 78.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. para. 79.
161 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (Iranian Pleadings), 88-91, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/ioppleadings/iop-ipleadings-19930608_memoria-ir_03.pdf
(June 8, 1993) [hereinafter Iranian Pleadings].
162 See Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 79.
163 See id. paras. 79-99.
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
1. Commercial Aspects of the Oil Platforms
The Court first determined whether only oil exports between
the United States and Iran were relevant to the proceedings. 164 At
the preliminary objection stage, the Court noted that it was
difficult to discern "if and to what extent the destruction of the
Iranian oil platforms had an effect upon the export trade in Iranian
oil." '165 In its pleadings, Iran sought to show that oil, whether
produced, processed by, transported from, or stored on the
platforms, was to some degree exported to the United States and,
therefore, part of the stream of commerce between the two
countries. 166 The United States, on the other hand, claimed that the
platforms were not engaged in producing goods for export to the
United States, and that its attacks did not destroy any oil that
otherwise would have been shipped to the United States.
167
Since the U.S. attacks did not damage the platform's subsea
lines used to transport oil for storage at nearby islands, the Court
held that there was not "prima facie interference with the transport
of goods mainly destined for export.' ' 168 Despite arguments by the
United States that its attacks on commercial oil platforms were
limited to the extent necessary so as to not breach the Treaty of
Amity, the Court held that Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity
applied to the "protection of freedom of commerce... [and] the
platforms attacked by the United States, and the attacks thus
impeded Iran's freedom of commerce.' 16' An integral part of the
Court's analysis, however, was whether the U.S. actions actually
interfered with freedom of commerce between the two countries
under the Treaty of Amity. 7 °
164 See id. para. 82. The United States also tried to question whether the oil
platforms were even within the "territory" of Iran for the purpose of the Treaty of Amity,
but the Court dismissed this argument as untenable. Id.
165 Preliminary Objection Judgment, supra note 2, paras. 50-5 1.
166 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 84; Iranian Pleadings, supra note 161, at 88-
89.
167 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 87.
168 Id. para. 88.
169 Id. para. 89.
170 See id. According to the Court decision, Article X(l) applied to the oil platforms
as part of the freedom of commerce of that Treaty, but the real question for analysis was
whether the attacks actually impeded the freedom of commerce between the two parties.
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2. U.S. Counter-Argument Against Commerce
The United States initially argued that the attacks did not affect
commerce between the two nations. First, the United States
claimed that the attack on the Reshadat platform did not affect
commerce between the two countries because it occurred while the
platform was under repair after an Iraqi attack, and thus, not
producing oil. 71 Therefore, according to the United States, the
platform was "not engaged in, or contributing to, commerce
between the territories of the Parties."' 72 Second, the United States
claimed that the attack on the Salman and Nasr platforms did not
directly affect commerce between the contracting parties because
the United States banned most Iranian imports after October 29,
1987.173 Executive Order 12,613 prohibited imports into the
United States of almost all Iranian goods, including oil. 74 Thus,
the United States reasoned that after the relevant date there was no
actual commerce between the two nations.1 75  In light of these
facts, the ICJ acknowledged that Iran's arguments regarding
continued commerce between the two parties appeared remote.
76
3. Iran 's Argument Regarding Commerce
In response, Iran asserted that the Executive Order violated the
Treaty of Amity and that the U.S. argument was circular. 77 In
other words, Iran accused the United States of justifying its
violation of the Treaty of Amity with a previous violation of the
same treaty, the previous violation itself illegally impeding
171 See id. para. 90.
172 Id. Iran claimed that production would resume on Oct. 24, 1987 (five days after
the attack), but the Court did not possess information about whether the repairs were on
schedule. Id. para. 93. Additionally, Iran did not bring any evidence showing that if
there had not been an attack on the Reshadat platform, production would have
commenced and constituted commerce between the United States and Iran. Id.
173 Id.
174 Exec. Order No. 12,613, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 30, 1987) (stating "[e]xcept
as otherwise provided in regulations issued pursuant to this Order, no goods or services
of Iranian origin may be imported into the United States, including its territories and
possessions, after the effective date of this Order"), available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/legalleo/12613 .pdf.
175 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 93.
176 Id.
177 Id. para. 94.
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commerce. Since Iran did not formally put these questions
regarding the legality of the embargo to the Court, the ICJ held
that it had not heard full arguments on Iran's assertions.'78
Accordingly, the Court only examined the actual effects of the
embargo by the United States.1
79
Iran next argued that the question of whether the embargo
impeded actual commerce between the two states rested on
whether indirect commerce continued after the Executive Order. 8 °
Even after the Order, Iran sold oil to refineries and commercial
interests in Western Europe and Asia, which, in turn, sold finished
products to the United States. 8' Iran claimed that their oil still
entered the United States through these commercial transactions
and that some of the oil from the oil platforms in question could
have entered this stream of commerce if the United States had not
destroyed the platforms. 8 2  The Court rejected this argument,
holding that the transactions were "not 'commerce' between Iran
and the United States, but rather 'commerce' between Iran and an
intermediate purchaser; and 'commerce' between an intermediate
seller and the United States."'183  The Court held that without an
ongoing financial interest in the actual oil goods that were
exchanged between the third party and the United States, the
Iranian sale of oil to third party countries did not constitute
commerce between Iran and the United States. 84 Thus, the Court
178 Id. Whether the embargo constituted a breach of the Treaty of Amity is an
intriguing issue. A deeper investigation potentially leads one to believe that the U.S.
actions were in breach of the Treaty of Amity, and one can only speculate upon the
reasons why the Iranian government did not actually include that charge in its pleadings.
It has been remarked that because the National Iranian Oil Company led the litigation in
the ICJ, the Iranian government did not present a formal claim against the embargo in
order to focus the litigation on the oil platforms damage, rather than the breach caused by
the embargo. Interview with Allen S. Weiner, supra note 7. Some speculation has been
made that Iran did not include the embargo as part of the ICJ case because they have
chosen to argue this in the Case A/30 before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal instead. Id.
179 See Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 94.
180 Id. paras. 96-97.
181 Id.
182 Id. para. 95. Iran produced an expert report showing an increase in oil exports
from Western European refineries to the United States, thereby claiming that Iranian oil
continued to reach the United States after the signing of the Executive Order. Id.
183 Id. para. 97.
184 Id.
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rejected Iran's claim against the United States for breach of
obligations under Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity, and it also
denied the Iranian claim for reparations for the oil platforms.'85
E. Judging the U.S. Counterclaims
After denying Iran's claim for reparations, the Court then
analyzed the counterclaim by the United States against the
government of Iran.'86 The United States alleged that Iran,
through its military, impaired its freedom of commerce and
freedom of navigation.187 The Court first examined ten alleged
attacks by Iran on U.S. vessels, starting on July 24, 1987 and
ending on June 11, 1988.188 The Court held that none of the
vessels that were attacked were "engaged in commerce or
navigation 'between the territories of the two High Contracting
Parties."" 89  Hence, the Court rejected the U.S. counterclaims
regarding all of those attacks.
The Court next examined the generic claim made by the
United States that Iran "made the Gulf unsafe" through an
amalgamation of "attacks on United States and other vessels,
laying mines and otherwise engaging in military actions in the
Persian Gulf."' 9° To succeed on this claim, the Court held that the
United States needed to demonstrate that Iran's actions created "an
actual impediment" to commerce or navigation between the two
countries.191 Because none of the specific incidents, nor the claim,
actually involved interference with navigation or commerce under
185 Id. paras. 98-99.
186 See id. paras. 101-124.
187 See id. paras. 101, 119. Iran lodged numerous objections to the U.S.
counterclaim, specifically that the counterclaim broadened the subject matter of the
claim beyond the original submissions to the Court. Id. para. 103. Iran also argued that
the counterclaim was presented without prior diplomatic negotiation (and therefore was
not in accordance with Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of Amity), that the U.S.
counterclaim was on behalf of third party states, and that the Court did not have
jurisdiction over counterclaims alleging a violation of the freedom of navigation. Id.
paras. 105-110. The Court ultimately decided that it could not uphold these objections of
Iran. Id. paras. 107, 109, 111, 115, 118.
188 Id. para. 120.
189 Id. para. 121.
190 Id. para. 122.
191 Id. para. 123.
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the Treaty of Amity, the Court denied the counterclaims of the
United States.1 92
It is intriguing that the ICJ did not engage in the same analysis
of the U.S. counterclaims as it did with the earlier Iranian claims.
Regarding the Iranian claim, the ICJ went straight to the Article X
analysis.' 93  It did not do so with the U.S. counterclaim,
however. 94 In addition, with the U.S. counterclaims, the Court
did not conduct an Article XX(1) use of force analysis, but instead
engaged in a very different mode of analysis than that used to
decide the Iranian claims. 95 As will be discussed below, this
Article alleges that the Court's analysis regarding the U.S.
counterclaims differed precisely because of the Court's desire to
comment on recent U.S. actions in other countries. 96 The
differing treatment of the virtually identical claims made by the
United States and Iran demonstrates that the ICJ's decision was
partly political commentary, rather than a judgment deriving
exclusively from principles of international law.
F. The Final Judgment
At the end of the fifty-five page decision, the sixteen judges of
the ICJ voted on the specific claims of both the Iranian and U.S.
governments. The judges denied the claims of each country. 97 In
a fourteen to two vote, the ICJ found that the actions of the United
States against the Iranian oil platforms were not justifiable
''measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of
the United States of America under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of
the [Treaty of Amity]."' 98 In this vote, however, the Court also
found that the actions of the United States claimed to be a breach
of Article X(1) by Iran did not constitute a breach of the Treaty of
192 Id. paras. 123-24.
193 See supra Part IV.D.
194 See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
195 Compare supra Part IV.C (discussing the ICJ's analysis of the U.S. self-defense
argument to the Iranian claims) with supra Part IV.E (discussing the ICJ's analysis of the
U.S. counterclaims).
196 See infra Part V.A-C.
197 Summary of Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003, supra note 8.
198 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 125. The judgment specifically notes that it
interprets this in the light of international law on the use of force. Id.
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Amity and, therefore, reparations for Iran would not be upheld.199
Additionally, by a fifteen to one vote, the Court rejected the
counterclaim by the United States against Iran for breach of
obligations of the Treaty of Amity and held that no reparations
were due the United States either.200 In Part V, this work will turn
to the inconsistencies and problems with this judgment, suggesting
a possible rationale behind the Court's unsettling decision.
V. The ICJ's Commentary on Current U.S. Actions and
Further Examination of the Oil Platforms Case
The Oil Platforms decision represents an interesting case study
regarding the role of exogenous political considerations in the
analysis and decisions of the ICJ. Indeed, the analysis of this
decision reveals that ICJ judges arguably played a political role in
this controversy. This Article contends that the desire of the
majority of the Court to comment on recent U.S. actions in
Afghanistan and Iraq colored the ICJ's decision.0 ' In addition, the
Court's failure to analyze either the "necessity" or
"proportionality" prongs of the use of force in self-defense
doctrine20 2 raises legitimate questions regarding contributions of
the ICJ to the development of a coherent, predictable set of
international rules that are capable of truly governing the behavior
of countries in the international arena. Rather than develop a
coherent doctrinal justification for its decision, the Court
succumbed to the temptation to "send a message" on the
appropriate use of force to the United States and to comment on
recent U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.0 3
A. The Court's Decision on Article XX(1)(d) Defenses
The ICJ decision denied both Iran's claims against the United
199 Id. The dissenting votes were by Judges A1-Khasawneh and Elaraby. Id.
200 Id. para. 125. The lone dissenting vote was by Judge Simma. Id.
201 Cf Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal), paras.
11-19, (commenting on the lack of jurisdiction of the Court to rule on the Article
XX(1)(d) defense claim by the United States once the Court held that the United States
had not violated Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity), at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106_buergentha.pdf
(Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal].
202 See supra Part IV.C.3.
203 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra note 201, para. 19.
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States and the U.S. claims against Iran for breach of Article X(1)
of the Treaty of Amity. 04 Although the Court held in a fourteen to
two judgment that the U.S. actions were justifiable measures
necessary to protect essential security interests," 5 several separate
opinions by judges on the ICJ exhibit misgivings with that
decision. Some members of the Court appear to have recognized
that the Court should have first analyzed Iran's claim regarding the
U.S. breach of Article X(l) prior to analyzing the Article XX(1)(d)
defense claim brought by the United States. 206 For example, Judge
Thomas Buergenthal, in his separate opinion, highlighted the
extraneous nature of the intermediate judgments made by the
Court and noted the flaws in the Court's reasoning on Article
XX(l)(d).2 7 He correctly asserted that this portion of the decision
does not belong in the judgment. 2 8  After all, once the Court
concluded that the United States did not violate Article X(l), the
Court then lacked the jurisdiction to interpret Article XX(l)(d). 0 9
Judge Owada also observed that the Court first analyzed the
Article XX(l)(d) issue prior to deciding the heart of Iran's claims
against the United States, but, logically speaking, the order should
have been reversed.210 Judge Higgins noted that the Court's
204 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 125.
205 Id.
206 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra note 201, paras. 2-3, 19; Separate
Opinion by Judge Owada, supra note 30, para. 3; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (separate
opinion of Judge Higgins), para. 2, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgmenL20031106higgins.PDF (Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter
Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins]. Judges Kooijmans and Parra-Arranguren also note
their distaste with deciding the Article XX(1) issue when the Court denied Iran's claims
under Article X(1). See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (separate opinion of Judge
Kooijmans), paras. 17-18, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/
iop-ijudgment_20031106jkooijmans.PDF (Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Separate Opinion
of Judge Kooijmans]; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (separate opinion of Judge Parra-
Arranguren), para. 14, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-
ijudgment20031106_parra.PDF (Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Separate Opinion of Judge
Parra-Arranguren].
207 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra note 201, paras. 2-3.
208 Id.
209 Id. para. 19.
210 Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, supra note 30, para. 3 (stating "I am of the
view that the natural and correct order in which the Court should proceed with claims...
would have to deal first of all with the issue of whether the actions of the United
States ... in fact constituted a violation of the obligations ... under Article X(1 ).
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judgment on the Article XX(l)(d) issue was disconcerting and that
the Court's reasoning and methodology on the issue was
"problematic."21
'
Challenging these opinions, however, Judge Simma defended
the Court, asserting that issues relating to the U.S. use of force
"are at the heart of this case" and, thus, the approach the Court
took was the proper one.212 In addition, Judge Koroma wrote in
his Declaration that the Court was bound to rule on the Article
XX(l)(d) issue and that the principles that it used were consistent
with general customary international law.213
The arguments of Judges Burgenthal, Owada, and Higgins are
logically sound, in contrast to the arguments of their colleagues on
the Court. By any standard, "the protection of essential security
interests" issue becomes irrelevant once the Court found no breach
of Article X(l) by the United States.
There are several plausible explanations for why these judges
expressed concern regarding the reasoning underlying the
judgment, but still, nevertheless, voted overwhelmingly in favor of
it. First, historically, there has been a strong push by the
Presidents of the ICJ to fashion large majorities for the Court's
judgments. 14 Even if judges disagree with certain aspects of a
ruling, they are strongly encouraged to vote favorably if the
outcome is agreeable.2 15 This is thought to increase the legitimacy
of the Court as an institution and to strengthen the force of the
211 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra note 206, para. 2.
212 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (separate opinion of Judge Simma), preface, at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106
_simma.PDF (Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Separate Opinion of Judge Simma].
213 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (declaration by Judge Koroma), 1, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106_koroma.PDF (Nov.
6, 2003) [hereinafter Declaration by Judge Koroma].
214 Interview with Allen S. Weiner, supra note 7. Looking at judgments over the
past couple of years, this assertion appears to be correct: a judgment of 10-3 in the
Genocide case between Bosnia and Serbia (2001), judgments ranging from 15-1 to 10-6
in the Arrest Warrant cases between the Congo and Belgium (2000), and judgments from
unanimous to 13-2 in the LeGrand case between Germany and the United States (1999).
See Contentious Cases Before the International Court of Justice (listing cases over the
past two decades and the votes for those cases), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
215 Interview with Allen S. Weiner, supra note 7.
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legal rules articulated by the Court.216
Second, the majority of the judges in this case may well have
desired to make a statement on the use of force doctrine in light of
the recent events relating to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It is not
likely any country will be able to challenge U.S. actions directly in
the ICJ. Hence, the Oil Platforms case was one of the few
opportunities for the ICJ to express its displeasure with the U.S.
interpretation of the use of force doctrine. Indeed, ICJ holdings
are not used as precedent in future Court cases, at least not in the
way that U.S. lawyers understand the principle of stare decisis, but
the Court's decisions do aid in the development of customary
international law.217 In this situation, the Court played an active
role in defining the proper use of force by rebuking the United
States for engaging in what many international legal scholars
would likely consider a legally proper use of force, even while the
Court denied Iran's claims.
Without looking at working drafts of the ICJ decision or being
privy to their internal discussions, one can only speculate as to
what the members of the Court thought while trying to craft the
decision in Oil Platforms.21 8  Nevertheless, at least five of the
fourteen judges expressed some concern or reservations regarding
the Court's reasoning.219  This, coupled with the obvious
incongruity of the Court's logic, suggests that the decision may
well have been at least in part politically motivated. The fact that
the Court did not actually need to decide the U.S. essential
security interest defense gives credence to the theory that the
rationale of Oil Platforms was not solely related to events in 1987
and 1988. Although a large majority concurred in the denial of
216 Id.
217 The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines its sources of
international law in Article 38, which lists "judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as part of the international law it
uses in making its decisions. ICI Statute, supra note 12, art. 38(l)(d).
218 One professor has speculated that it would be interesting to see these actual
drafts in order to see how they were changed in order to get the judges to agree to a 14-2
opinion. Interview with Allen S. Weiner, supra note 7.
219 See Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra note 201, paras. 2-3; Separate
Opinion of Judge Owada, supra note 30, para. 3; Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins,
supra note 206, para. 2; Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, supra note 206, paras.
17-18; Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Arranguren, supra note 206, para. 14.
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Iran's claims and the U.S. defenses to those claims, over one-third
of that majority took issue with major portions of the reasoning of
the decision.2
B. A Noted "Lack of Evidence " and Operational Concerns
The Court ruled that the evidence presented by the United
States concerning the events leading up to its attack on the oil
platforms was not sufficient to support the "essential security
interest" argument. 21  Despite volumnious evidence regarding
Iranian actions, mining activities, missile launches, and a three-
page description of ten separate alleged attacks, the Court still
concluded that the United States had not offered conclusive
evidence of an Iranian attack.2 2 The decision does not provide
countries with a logical framework for protecting their "essential
security interests." "Highly suggestive, but not conclusive,
evidence"1 is something that lawyers might be able to parse with
enough time and money, but it does not provide adequate guidance
to the commander of a naval vessel or a military head. The
Court's decision, while resolving the immediate dispute, makes
little headway towards creating more defined terms and
practicable precedents within international law.
This failing was not lost on a substantial number of the
judges.2 According to Judge Owada, there was an "asymmetry in
the production of evidence" before the Court, especially since the
U.S. actions were general public knowledge, whereas the alleged
Iranian attacks were not. 5 Because of this asymmetry and the
acknowledged difficulties in securing reliable evidence, Judge
Owada urged the Court to further examine the evidence prior to
holding on a use of force violation by the United States.226 As a
220 See supra note 219 and the sources cited therein.
221 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 78.
222 Id. paras. 61, 71.
223 Id. para. 71(stating "[t]he evidence is highly suggestive, but not conclusive").
224 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra note 201, paras. 33-47; Separate
Opinion of Judge Owada, supra note 30, paras. 41, 46, 48-52.
225 Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, supra note 30, paras. 41-46.
226 Id. para. 44. Judge Owada states:
[I]t would only be on the basis of such ascertained full facts that the Court could
assess in a conclusive manner whether the alleged actions of the United States
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corrollary to this assertion of asymmetry in evidence, Judge
Owada implored the Court to act as a fact-finder and to take a
more proactive stance in the administration of justice.227 In his
separate opinion, Judge Buergenthal echoed Judge Owada's
concerns, remarking on the Court's flawed application of the
standards of evidence to the detriment of the United States.228
These separate opinions exhibit a profound disquiet, yet both
judges reaffirmed their support of the overall holding of Oil
Platforms. The Oil Platforms decision can thus be seen, at least in
part, as an occasion on the part of some of the judges to comment
on recent U.S. actions, despite the fact that certain parts of the
reasoning and the actual holding alarm a minority of the judges.
This case also makes clear, however, that the ICJ as an
institution is not as well-equipped to deal with fact-intensive cases.
The ICJ, as a court of both plenary first jurisdicition and final
appellate jurisdiction, is well-suited to decide matters of law.229
Without the institutions and evidentiary rules that characterize
most national and state courts, however, the ICJ is not well-
equipped to decide cases that involve large amounts of purely
factual evidence. Indeed, this case suggests that the ICJ should
work to develop stronger rules of evidence and mechanisms for
resolving evidentiary issues. Both Judges Owada and Buergenthal
give support to the contention that the Oil Platforms holding
met the conditions prescribed by the provisions of Article XX, paragraph 1(d),
including, as relevant, the rules of general international law on the use of force.
This, I submit, the Court has not done. In order to do that, in my view, the
Court would have had to go deeper into ascertaining the facts surrounding the
case.
Id.
227 Id. para. 52. Judge Owada states:
I should have liked to see the Court engage in a much more in-depth
examination of this difficult problem of ascertaining the facts of the case...
through various powers and procedural means available to the Court...
including those relating to the questions of the burden of proof and the standard
of proof ....
Id.
228 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra note 201, para. 46 (stating "[b]y
failing to differentiate between the requirements of that Article and those of international
law on the use of force, the Court erroneously fails to examine important evidence
presented by the United States in justification of the measures it took against Iran").
229 ICJ Statute, supra note 12, arts. 36, 60.
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would have been more favorable to the United States if the Court
possessed a greater capacity to resolve factual disputes.23 °
The Court's holding that the U.S.-presented evidence was
"highly suggestive, but not conclusory 231 also demonstrates the
enormous discretion lodged in the Court when it is analyzing
factual evidence.232  This very leeway is precisely what enabled
the Court to hold against the U.S. Article XX(1)(d) essential
security interest defense, thereby allowing the ICJ an opportunity
to reprimand the current U.S. use of force against other nations.233
The ICJ's virtually untrammeld freedom to determine its own use
of the evidence is a boon to those judges who desire to opine on
matters extraneous to the issues immediately at hand. 234  Though
all decisions before the Court are binding only between the parties
before the Court and only on the actual case before the Court,235
the ICJ's holding in Oil Platforms appears to be an attempt to
allow judges to counsel the United States and other nations
considering using force against any nation, especially when those
judges might disagree as a policy matter.
230 See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
231 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 71.
232 ICJ Statute, supra note 12, arts. 44, 48, 52. Only Articles 44, 48, and 52 of the
ICJ Statute deal with evidentiary issues, and none of these articles set up any type of
evidentiary rules for the use of evidence, burden of proof, or procurement of evidence.
Id. For example, Article 48 states "[the Court] make all arrangements connected with
the taking of evidence." Id. art. 48. Article 52 states "[a]fter the Court has received the
proofs and evidence within the time specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any
further oral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the other side
consents." Id. art. 52.
233 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 78.
234 It has been commented "that the standard of proof the Court applied was very
high - perhaps even a requirement of 'conclusive' proof, an extremely high standard."
John R. Cook, Current Development: The 2003 Judicial Activity of the International
Court of Justice, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 309, 311 (2004). The Court's actions "leave the
impression that the Court did not pay particular regard to the cumulative weight of
evidence... [and] suggests that items of evidence were individually assessed and
individually dismissed as insufficient to show attribution, without reference to
cumulative weight." Id. Indeed, if one were to review closely the actual evidence placed
before the Court in the written pleadings, one might come away wondering if one could
ever prove lawful self-defense before the Court, as it appears that the justices are not
willing to make even the smallest connections in the inevitable gaps in evidentiary proof.
235 ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 59.
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C. The Court's Holding on the "Necessity'" and
"Proportionality" Defenses
The Court's analysis of the "necessity" and "proportionality"
prongs of the self-defense doctrine may be largely a device to
allow some judges an opportunity to make policy pronouncements
that are untethered to basic international legal principles. The
opinion of the Court on these issues is highly conclusory, rather
than specific.236 The Court only asserts that these aspects of self-
defense are part of the rule of customary international law and that
it is "not satisfied" that these requirements have been proven.23
Rather than explaining the precise factors involved in deciding
whether the two prongs are fulfilled, the Court simply asserts its
conclusion with virtually no legal or factual analysis.238 For a
Court that is charged with aiding the development of international
law,239 it appears highly counterintuitive, indeed inappropriate, for
the Court to fail to articulate the reasons for its holding on certain
issues that are of extreme importance to the case and to the
international community at large.
The Oil Platforms holding on the use of force claim is opaque,
as the Court does not explain why it is not satisfied with the
defenses presented by the United States. The use of force doctrine
within international law is one of the most complicated and
confusing legal doctrines states face,24° and it is important for the
Court to clarify that doctrine. If the Court evaluated the "necessity
and proportionality" defenses in terms of the evidence offered in
this case, the Court would have had to explain its precise reasons
for not upholding the U.S. defense. To put it another way, if the
Court's reasoning against the U.S. use of force defense was
factually developed and legally sound, then the Court would have
expanded on and published those reasons. Legally sound
reasoning would have considerably aided the international
community in its understanding of the limits of self-defense. But
the ICJ did not expand upon or publish its reasoning. The lack of
236 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 76-77.
237 Id. para. 76.
238 See id. paras. 76-77.
239 See ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 38.
240 SCHACTER, supra note 18, at 141.
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reasoning and clarity in the ICJ decision on "necessity" and
"proportionality" supports the view that the Court's holding was
intended, at least in some measure, as a comment on the current
U.S. use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than on its actual
use of force in 1987 and 1988.
D. Raising Questions About the ICJ and Its Role in the
International Community
The Oil Platforms case raises questions about the current
scope and future reach of the International Court of Justice. The
lack of evidence and the procedural issues raised by several judges
supports a conclusion that the Oil Platforms Court attempted to
decide something relevant to the world scene but not within its
immediate jurisdictional mandate. Several judges in the decision
argue that the Court's holding extended beyond the original
question the Court was asked to rule upon,241 while other judges
remarked that the Court stayed within its jurisdictional limits. 242
The split on this issue, even among the judges themselves, raises
serious concerns for the international community. If the Oil
Platforms Court is able to extend its jurisdiction on certain matters
by unilaterally deeming them appropriate to the case at hand, it is
only a matter of time before the Court extends the holdings of
other cases. Such overreaching may considerably damage the
Court's legitimacy and should be of great concern to all who value
its role as an international law-making institution.
Overreaching by the ICJ may also raise concerns within the
international community about other international tribunals. The
Court's possible extension of the subject matter of the Oil
Platforms claim is fuel for advocates arguing against the
advisability of international tribunals. The Court's extension of
the holding in this case may also increase anxiety in countries that
usually support the rule of law and avail themselves of the
jurisdiction of the ICJ and other international tribunals. Indeed,
this concern over the extension of jurisdiction and subject matter is
one of the arguments made by the United States for not supporting
some international tribunals such as the International Criminal
241 See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
242 See Declaration of Judge Koroma, supra 213; Separate Opinion of Judge Simma,
supra note 212, para. 3-4.
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Court.24 3 There is a legitimite concern that such tribunals will
become more politically motivated instead of abiding by and
advancing the rule of law.
Additionally, in terms of the fact-finding issue discussed above
in Part V.B., the international community might also need to
rethink what cases should be brought to the ICJ. If the cases are
highly fact specific and turn largely on the resolution of
complicated factual matters, rather than on questions of law, it
might behoove parties to seek and develop other methods of
adjudication. Several of the judges in the Oil Platforms case
remarked on this phenomenon, opining that the ICJ should
establish higher evidentiary standards and develop clearer
evidentiary rules.244 If the ICJ is to continue to hear contentious
cases and act as a fact-finder of first instance for international
disputes, the Court must improve its rules on evidence and
presentation of facts. For the moment, however, parties should be
aware of these limitations and should act accordingly. Indeed, the
Court's legacy as a fact-finder should not be viewed as strongly as
its legacy as a interpreter of treaties and arbitor of customary
international law.
VI. Conclusion
The ICJ's decision in the Oil Platforms case raises many
questions regarding the proper use of force in self-defense, the
appropriate interpretation of certain treaty provisions, and the
precise contours of the doctrine of self-defense. The holding itself
denies both parties' claims and leaves each country without the
reparations they sought. But, when one analyzes the decision
more closely, a number of concerns with the Court's holding arise.
The recent circumstances of the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan and
Iraq likely had a serious effect on the Court's decision. The "lack
of evidence" noted by the Court bolsters the conclusion that the
Court's holding in Oil Platforms may have been more politically,
rather than legally, motivated. The Court's lack of explanation
243 See Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1633,
1635 (2003) (discussing the Bush Administration's opposition to the ICC); Edward T.
Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2061, 2082 (2003) (discussing the Bush
Administration's decision to "unsign" the Treaty promulgating the ICC).
244 See supra Part V.B.
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and reasoning for its ruling on the "necessity" and
"proportionality" prongs of the U.S. self-defense claim also
suggests that the Court might have been motivated to reprimand
the United States for its current activities as opposed to its past
actions that were before the Court.
Of course, as an impartial institution set up to adjudicate
disputes between nations, the ICJ's position in the international
community is constantly changing as it decides more cases and
establishes its own jurisprudence. But the Oil Platforms case
raises serious concerns about whether the Court is adequately
equipped to undertake the role to which it appears to aspire. If the
Court desires to expand its role, it must overhaul evidentiary rules
and establish burden of proof requirements. The case also raises
questions as to the proper role of the ICJ in determining certain
international legal principles, such as the appropriate use of force
doctrine and self-defense exceptions. In terms of explaining
relevant rules on the appropriate use of force and self-defense, the
Oil Platforms case does not offer much guidance for states or
scholars. When viewed as a commentary on current U.S. actions
involving use of force and a reprimand against the United States,
the Oil Platforms case is highly instructive about how the ICJ
views itself, its legacy, and its future.
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